

TCP 22-75

C 1 of 1
No. 22-75

Trends in Communist Propaganda

4 Jun 75

Confidential



TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

4 JUNE 1975

(VOL. XXVI, NO. 22)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FPIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

Classified by 050073
Subject to General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declassified
Two Years From Date of Issue

National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

CONTENTS

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP

Moscow Comment on NATO Visit Emphasizes "Contradictions"	1
East Europeans Stress NATO Disunity, Opposition to Spain	5
Peking Applauds President Ford's Leadership at NATO Summit	6
Ford-Sadat Talks in Salzburg Draw Sparse Moscow Attention.	8

INDOCHINA

North Vietnam Convenes First Session of New National Assembly.	11
DRV Follows Moderate Line on U.S. Policies, U.S.-DRV Relations	12
Pathet Lao Demand Purge of Rightists, Hail U.S. AID Expulsion.	14

KOREA

Kim Stresses Peace, Third World Unity in North Africa.	17
--	----

INDONESIAN CP

Party's 55th Anniversary Observed by PKI, PRC, USSR.	20
--	----

USSR

Shcherbitskiy Assumes Control Over Kiev City Party Organization.	22
Gosplan Chairman Baybakov Warns of Growing Foreign Threat.	24

NOTES

Moscow on Peking Border Talks; Sino-U.S. Relations; PRC Educational Policy	26
---	----

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics.	i
--	---

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 1 -

PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP

Moscow has given little more than routine attention to President Ford's trip to Europe, providing a sketchy record of his activities and statements in brief TASS reports and relying mainly on replays of Western press comment to convey a generally disparaging assessment of the state of the NATO alliance.

Initial Moscow reaction to the 29-30 May NATO Council summit meeting has echoed themes broached in pre-summit comment, stressing that the summit session gave President Ford the opportunity to try to "soften the blow" and "ease the crisis of confidence" following the collapse of U.S. policy in Vietnam and Cambodia. Short reports on President Ford's statements in Brussels noted that he expressed hope for relaxation of international tensions while "at the same time" again urging the strengthening of NATO. Comment on the summit meeting focused largely on the standard theme of difficulties and "contradictions" within the alliance, offering no assessment of the President's role. Moscow provided only brief coverage of his trip to Spain, TASS singling out the London OBSERVER's comment that he made a "big error" in visiting Madrid, while commentators asserted that Washington was dealt a "rebuff" in its efforts to obtain NATO endorsement of a Spanish role in the defense of West Europe.

Moscow's East European allies viewed the results of the NATO session with skepticism and remarked on what they considered meager results, and in regard to the President's Madrid visit noted opposition among other NATO members to U.S. overtures toward Spain. The Peking media have portrayed the President's NATO visit as the successful beginning of a major U.S. effort to restore the unity of the Western alliance against alleged Soviet ambitions in the area.

Moscow gave only limited attention to the President's 1-2 June talks with Egyptian President as-Sadat in Salzburg, noting that no communique had been issued and reportedly no decisions taken pending the President's talks next week with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. Reportage and some related comment has conveyed in muted fashion Moscow's continued antipathy to renewed step-by-step negotiations and its adherence to the Geneva peace conference as a forum for a settlement.

MOSCOW COMMENT ON NATO VISIT EMPHASIZES "CONTRADICTIONS"

Moscow comment on the NATO Council session again emphasized, as it has done repeatedly in the past, the "contradictions" and "difficulties"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 2 -

among individual countries of the alliance over economic policy, defense spending, energy, and various political questions. Moscow also pointed to the "serious concern" of alliance members over developments on NATO's southern flank--the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and the trend of Portuguese developments. Commentators tended to discuss what IZVESTIYA foreign affairs editor Albert Grigoryants termed the "erosion of NATO" without attempting to assess the impact of the President's trip on alliance relationships.

The President's activities and remarks were summed up in brief TASS reports and in radio newscasts. TASS on the 30th, reporting the President's speech to the NATO Council, highlighted his "admission" of the "serious difficulties" existing between NATO partners and noted that he called for unconditional participation and not partial membership--a reference, TASS explained, to the French and Greek positions with regard to NATO's military organization. TASS said the President called for improvement in the process of political consultation among alliance members, and that he gave priority to a further buildup of NATO's military might. The President, TASS said, declared that NATO tasks required increased military budgets, a matter of great difficulty "because of the change in attitude of public and political circles under the influence of detente."

Reporting the President's news conference at the end of the Council session, a Moscow English-language broadcast on the 31st said he expressed optimism about the prospects of relaxation of tension, and hoped that progress at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would make it possible to conclude the conference "in the near future and at summit level." The broadcast also cited him as saying there was "every prerequisite" for signing the Soviet-American SALT agreement, which he hoped would be done during Brezhnev's coming U.S. visit. But the report went on to note that "at the same time" the President urged the strengthening of NATO, calling it the cornerstone of U.S. policy; it observed that his remarks "reflected dissatisfaction" with the growing tendency to reduce military commitments to the alliance.

ARMS RACE, Soviet comment on both the summit and the preparatory
CSCE, MBFR defense minister's meeting on 22-23 May denounced the
alliance for allegedly continuing the arms race, noting
among other things that the United States would further increase its
combat forces in West Europe. A RED STAR article on 1 June pointedly
cited West German papers as observing that Washington allegedly wanted
the FRG Bundeswehr increased by 100,000 men. PRAVDA and RED STAR
replayed comment by West German media observers that described as
"dictatorial" Secretary Schlesinger's call after the defense ministers'
meeting for continued West European support for NATO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 3 -

Moscow also seized on publicity surrounding Secretary Schlesinger's report to Congress on the possible first use of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to repel a conventional Soviet attack, pointing out that such statements were in keeping with NATO demands for increasing armaments. Two days after the New York TIMES carried an account of Schlesinger's report, a 1 June PRAVDA article by American specialist Sergey Vishnevskiy criticized the Secretary for being out of touch with "sober-thinking Americans" who "warmly approved" the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of nuclear war and "the agreements concluded by the government to which he belongs."

Moscow took note of the summit communique's language on CSCE, TASS reporting that it said there would be progress toward easing tension if the CSCE "were concluded on satisfactory terms and its words translated into deeds." But comment has contrasted this with alleged NATO calls for continuing the arms race. And Soviet commentators have issued pro forma rebuttals to calls in the West that the NATO states should not agree to the final CSCE summit until the Soviet Union makes basic compromises on certain fundamental issues at Geneva. IZVESTIYA foreign affairs editor Grigoryants, for example, in a discussion of the summit and CSCE on Moscow radio's weekly international observers program on 1 June, assailed the New York TIMES for suggesting a "freeze" on CSCE work and charged that this suggestion was part of a NATO attempt to "mislead the public and to make it easier to carry out costly military ventures."

Moscow has ignored the NATO discussion of the Vienna force reduction negotiations. Its attitude toward these talks was expressed in strikingly unequivocal terms in a recent article by West European expert D. Proektor, member of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In an article in the May issue of that institute's journal, Proektor indicated that conditions for movement in the area of "military detente" in Europe would not be ripe until the CSCE had been successfully completed. In the context of discussing the process of "creating a system of European security," Proektor linked CSCE and MBFR in declaring: "To be sure, the necessary political prerequisites have not yet been created and, in principle, it is impossible to implement any significant far-reaching measures either with respect to the limitation of the arms race or partial disarmament." But he implied some urgency on MBFR progress when he went on to say that "however, when the political problems of strengthening peace are being successfully resolved, the prolonged protraction of analogous processes in the military sphere could have a negative effect on European security and impede the formation of a new system of international relations."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 4 -

SPANISH ISSUE TASS' account of President Ford's speech at the NATO Council session reported that he "insisted" on discussing the question of drawing Spain into the alliance, and noted that this plan raised "serious objections" on the part of some NATO members, such as Britain. Commentators noted that the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway also "resolutely" opposed the U.S. efforts to achieve closer cooperation between Spain and NATO. Summing up the session, Moscow pointed out that U.S. attempts to secure closer Spanish-NATO military cooperation "were not crowned with success," TASS observing that the communique passed over this issue in silence.

PRAVDA's Y. Yakhontov, in the paper's weekly international review on 1 June, claimed that Schlesinger was dealt a "rebuff" by his NATO colleagues at the defense ministers' meeting when he "tried to make them approve Spain's 'de facto' incorporation into the North Atlantic system." Commenting on the U.S. "failure" to obtain from its allies acknowledgment of a Spanish "role in European defense" and the "military usefulness" of the U.S. bases in Spain, a RED STAR article by colonels Ponomarev and Vinogradov on 1 June asserted that Washington still had "not abandoned its attempts somehow or other to drag Madrid into the North Atlantic bloc."

In scanty coverage of President Ford's 31 May-1 June visit to Spain, TASS briefly reported his arrival remark that the visit was a recognition of Madrid's "significance as a 'friend and partner.'" TASS added an editorial aside that "observers" saw the main aim of the Madrid visit as advancing the protracted talks on U.S. bases in Spain. Citing news agency reports, TASS on 1 June said the President had secured Franco's consent for the bases to remain, adding that confidence had been expressed that a satisfactory agreement on the question could be worked out this month. Under a London dateline, TASS picked up the OBSERVER's comment that the President's visit "reaffirms the view that the United States thinks only of military bases, cold war strategy, and support for any anticommunist regime." According to the OBSERVER, TASS noted, the President should have visited Lisbon, not Madrid.

An article in the 4 June PRAVDA by A. Istomin, reviewed by TASS, discerned ever-increasing internal Spanish opposition to the renewal of the bases agreement, an issue which Moscow has followed closely in recent weeks. Istomin observed that the problem of extending the agreement was becoming "politically acute," with even conservatives joining the "progressive and democratic" forces in opposition to the U.S. military presence. He claimed that the "top politicians" of the Madrid regime had demanded a guarantee from Washington for a "stable regime" as one condition for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 5 -

extension of the agreement, at a time when the "reactionary Franco dictatorship" was counting its last days. This theme was also stressed by Spanish Communist Party (PCE) leader Santiago Carrillo, according to an account of an interview given in Paris broadcast by the PCE's Radio Independent Spain on 3 June. Carrillo argued that President Ford was "compromising U.S. prestige" in personally visiting Spain, rather than sending "any other diplomatic representative" to deliver whatever offer he had to the Franco government.

EAST EUROPEANS STRESS NATO DISUNITY, OPPOSITION TO SPAIN

Moscow's orthodox East European allies took a generally skeptical approach in their moderate level of comment on President Ford's trip. In a typical observation, the Budapest government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on 1 June viewed the "unusually brief" communique ending the NATO session as indicating that little had happened to boast about, despite the President's hopes that the meeting would be a manifestation of clarification and Atlantic unity. The paper assessed the President's reassurances that U.S. troops would not be unilaterally withdrawn from Europe as an indication that the NATO allies still wanted a strong U.S. military presence, as well as the American nuclear umbrella, and intended to deal with the East, as before, from a policy of strength. In a less critical vein, Poland's ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 2d commented that while the Brussels meeting had not accomplished much in concrete terms it had at least "proved" that the United States was still interested in Europe and had shown that the President had "his own views on foreign policy."

On specific issues, the 1 June MAGYAR HIRLAP commentary remarked that both sides in the Cyprus dispute blamed the United States for the crisis there, and that their hopes that the United States and NATO would come up with a solution had been disappointed. On the issue of Spain, ZYCIE WARSZAWY noted that Western Europe would not agree to including Spain in NATO and that the Dutch prime minister "openly argued this with the U.S. President." Similarly, a Prague domestic service commentary on 1 June stressed the negative attitude of other NATO members to the U.S. policy of "wooing" Spain and "dragging" that country into NATO. It also noted that the other NATO members did not accept the U.S. view that the presence of communists in the Portuguese government constituted a "threat" to NATO. A Leuschner talk carried by the East Berlin radio on the 30th took the tack that the "hurry" to get Spain into NATO could be attributed to fears that Spain, like Portugal, might take the "democratic" road after Franco left the scene.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

Of the East European mavericks, Belgrade has reacted in restrained tones to the results of the Brussels summit, while the Romanians have not commented on the gathering so far. The Yugoslavs, after commenting on the eve of the conference that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had lost their reasons for existing, voiced disappointment through a 2 June Zagreb radio talk by Sundic pointing out that the emphasis in Brussels on detente had been followed by allegedly threatening statements by Secretary Schlesinger against the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. On the subject of Spain, a Belgrade radio talk on the 2d concluded that since the NATO allies had made their opposition to Spain's membership clear in Brussels, they were not greatly disturbed by President Ford's trip to Madrid. The Albanian party daily ZERI I POPULLIT commented characteristically on the 3d that the NATO meeting and the President's European tour would "aggravate still more the tense situation created in Europe as a result of the aggressive policy of the two superpowers."

PEKING APPLAUDS PRESIDENT FORD'S LEADERSHIP AT NATO SUMMIT

Peking has devoted substantial media attention to President Ford's role at the NATO summit, with several NCNA reports detailing the President's activities in Brussels.* The reports have viewed positively President Ford's efforts to ease NATO worries over Portugal, Greek-Turkish tensions, and the Western economic recession and have hailed his attempts to revitalize Western unity and resolve against the USSR. They have depicted the President's Brussels trip as the first step in a major U.S. diplomatic offensive to shore up positions in Europe and the Middle East following the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, and have approvingly noted Soviet concern over the President's efforts.

Two NCNA reports on 29 May and a report on the 31st stressed President Ford's statements at the summit underscoring the U.S. military commitment to NATO, particularly to the alliance's

* Former President Nixon's attendance at the NATO summit in June 1974 had been reported by NCNA in standard fashion, with a single NCNA article portraying that visit positively as a further demonstration of U.S. diplomatic strength against Moscow, following the successes of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 7 -

provision for mutual self-defense. For example, the 29 May NCNA report on the first session quoted President Ford as saying that the aim of the meeting was "to renew our commitment to the alliance," and "to restate our pledge to collective self-defense." The 31 May NCNA report played up statements by the major West European leaders expressing approval for President Ford's restatement of the U.S. defense commitment to NATO and voicing their own determination to promote closer West European union so as to become a stronger U.S. partner in the alliance. A separate NCNA 31 May report on the Brussels meeting of the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey highlighted the positive results of their talks as another accomplishment of President Ford's mediation which served to shore up NATO's southern flank against Moscow.

Peking gave special attention to remarks by the President and in the formal NATO summit communique which emphasized Western determination to scrutinize carefully Soviet "detente" diplomacy and to demand significant concessions from the USSR. NCNA on the 29th reported President Ford's remarks to West European correspondents six days earlier that the United States would not allow detente to become a Soviet license to "fish in troubled waters" and that Washington would strengthen relations with West Europe and the Middle East so as to have "a better opportunity to use detente for the purposes for which it was designed." Another 29 May report noted the President's warning at the summit session that day that the United States and its allies must assure that Soviet promises made at the European Security conference "are translated into action."

A 31 May NCNA report reflected unmistakable Chinese approval of the summit in citing West European press comment that Moscow was "concerned about the strengthening of NATO" and that the "NATO summit and Ford's trip to Europe have caused the Soviet Union a great deal of anxiety." The report noted the NATO communique's stress on the need for meaningful Soviet concessions at the European Security Conference and its formal linkage of European detente with progress at the MBFR negotiations and with the situation in Berlin. The report concluded by referring to U.S. press reports that the President's visit marked the beginning of a broad U.S. diplomatic offensive designed to concentrate on "more crucial questions" of Europe and the Middle East following the end of Washington's "Southeast Asian obsession."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 8 -

FORD-SADAT TALKS IN SALZBURG DRAW SPARSE MOSCOW ATTENTION

President Ford's talks with Egyptian President as-Sadat, in Salzburg on 1-2 June, have drawn only sparse and noncommittal coverage from Soviet media. Continued Soviet objections to "so-called" step-by-step diplomacy was conveyed in low-keyed fashion when Moscow's reportage noted that resumption of this approach was among the possibilities discussed. At the same time, some routine comment on the Mideast situation has continued to maintain, albeit with no great emphasis, that the Geneva peace conference, if "thoroughly prepared," is the proper forum for seeking peace. Moscow would appear to be marking time until after President Ford's meeting in Washington next week with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and a U.S. announcement of the results of its Mideast policy reassessment. Observing that the timing of Rabin's announcement of a reduction of Israel's armed forces along the Sinai front, in connection with the 5 June opening of the Suez Canal, coincided with the end of the Salzburg talks, Moscow dismissed Israel's "ostentatious 'peaceful' gesture" as one of no military significance.

REPORTAGE ON TALKS . TASS followed the Ford-Sadat talks through a series of short reports which offered no original Soviet comment. On the eve of the talks TASS briefly singled out as-Sadat's remark at an impromptu Vienna press conference on 31 May that his meeting with President Ford would cover developments in the Middle East relative to "the failure of Kissinger's Mideast mission," and that "for us, there is no alternative to the Geneva conference." On 1 June TASS summed up other recent statements by as-Sadat, noting merely that they indicated he "attaches much importance to the U.S. role" in a Mideast settlement. TASS also cited foreign news agencies as reporting that "Egypt does not rule out a possibility of resumption of so-called 'step-by-step' settlement" and that President Ford hopes that "U.S. step-by-step' diplomacy will have a fresh opportunity."

TASS on the 2d reported U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Sisco as saying that the first meeting had covered both "a return to attempts at a 'stage-by-stage' settlement" and resumption of the Geneva conference. Sisco, TASS said, "admitted" that no concrete decisions had been reached, and it recalled that Secretary Kissinger had said prior to arrival in Salzburg that all issues to be discussed by President Ford with President as-Sadat would also be discussed with Prime Minister Rabin. Reporting the conclusion of the talks on the 2d, TASS cited President Ford as saying that the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 9 -

meeting was held "in a constructive spirit" and that further consultations on a Mideast settlement would occur in the next few weeks. President as-Sadat was reported as saying that various ways of settling the Mideast situation had been discussed in the "intensive" talks.

Moscow radio said on the 3d that, in the absence of a communique, one could only speculate on the substance of the talks on the basis of brief press conference remarks. After referring to President Ford's statement on further consultations, it quoted Secretary Kissinger as saying that "we did not work out any concrete measures with Egypt for presentation to Tel Aviv," and that "the Geneva Middle East peace conference should be convened."*

RELATED COMMENT A scattering of routine comment, explicitly or implicitly pegged to the Salzburg talks, suggested Soviet suspicions that the "step-by-step" approach was being revived. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 2d, noting Sisco's remark that "the possibility of concluding a bilateral agreement" between Israel and Egypt had been discussed, pointedly mentioned that the latest issue of NEWSWEEK carried a summary of a proposed three-year Egyptian-Israeli "draft agreement." The agreement, according to the broadcast, would entail Israel's withdrawal "from part of the occupied Egyptian territories" in exchange for Egypt's "unilateral agreement" to forswear the use of force against Israel. The broadcast claimed it was the "unanimous" view of "Arab press commentators" that the most direct way to solve the Mideast problem was the resumption, not of bilateral talks, but of the Geneva conference "with the participation of all parties concerned."

In Moscow radio's 1 June observers' roundtable, IZVESTIYA foreign affairs editor Grigoryants referred to the Salzburg talks, the 11-12 June Ford-Rabin meeting, and reports that a new U.S. Mideast approach would subsequently be announced, noting that U.S. diplomatic moves were closely followed by the Arab states. Radio-TV commentator

* Cairo radio, in a report on Secretary Kissinger's 2 June press conference, quoted him as saying that the United States was not advocating a particular method of settlement but was preparing to go to Geneva, adding that "if we could find another way, we would follow it" and that "we have not excluded any way from our discussions."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 10 -

Seyful-Mulyukov, in a general discussion of the Mideast situation, reiterated the Soviet view that "no temporary separate deals" about Israeli withdrawal from individual Arab countries could lead to an overall solution; the road to peace, he maintained, leads to resumption of the Geneva conference, "provided it is thoroughly and seriously prepared."

An A. Timoshkin commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 3d, referring to Foreign Minister Gromyko's 2 June election speech, stressed that the USSR advocated an "overall settlement" of fundamental Mideast problems through an international agreement. In an apparent reference to the Salzburg meeting, Timoshkin asserted that "an ineffective plan is again being defended. It is an erroneous plan for a partial settlement using secret means by ill-reputed quiet diplomacy and comes as a result of the latest international contacts in the search for a settlement of the Middle East problem."

SINAI FRONT As the Salzburg talks were ending, TASS on 2 June
REDUCTIONS cited a UPI report of Prime Minister Rabin's
 announcement that Israel would cut back its armed
forces along the Sinai front "as a goodwill gesture towards
Egypt." TASS noted that Rabin denied he sought to influence the
talks. In its subsequent reaction to this, Moscow has relied
chiefly on replays of foreign comment to criticize Tel Aviv for
taking a propagandistic step of no military significance. TASS
on the 3d, referring to the decision as "step-by-step diplomacy
Israeli style," contrasted what it called "ostentatious 'peaceful'
gestures" with Israel's "stubborn refusal to agree to a
comprehensive political settlement." Similarly, a Zlatorunskiy
commentary in Arabic on the 3d disparaged the idea that the
Israeli decision marked a "turning point" in Israel's policy,
stressing that Tel Aviv's reduction of its occupation forces
while refusing to withdraw from the occupied territories "cannot
be called a policy of peace."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 11 -

INDOCHINA

NORTH VIETNAM CONVENES FIRST SESSION OF NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The first session of the DRV's Fifth National Assembly opened in Hanoi on 3 June. According to media reports, the session will run through the 6th and its agenda includes government reports "on the situation and tasks," on the military situation and diplomatic work, and on the results of the 6 April election that chose the deputies attending the present meeting. In addition, as the inaugural session of a new legislature, the current National Assembly meeting will elect personnel to the leading government organs--a function last performed in June 1971 at the opening of the Fourth National Assembly.

The leadership turnout at the latest session conforms--both in attendance and ranking--to previous such conclaves, with Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Hoang Van Hoan reported present. On the first day, National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh delivered the customary brief opening remarks, Premier Pham Van Dong, resuming his customary role as keynoter, delivered the main government report,* and National Assembly Standing Committee Vice Chairman Hoang Van Hoan spoke on the election results. On the following day, according to Hanoi radio's report, the Assembly heard a report on the 1975 general offensive by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and a foreign policy report by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh.

According to the DRV constitution, under ordinary conditions the term of office of the National Assembly runs four years, and with the first session of the last National Assembly having been convened in June 1971, the meeting of the present Assembly at this time conforms to this provision. Although the constitution calls for biannual sessions, during the war the Assembly met more on an annual basis--a pattern that was formally authorized by the Third National Assembly in 1965.

* Pham Van Dong was not the main speaker at the last previous meetings of the Assembly--the fourth and fifth session of the Fourth National Assembly--held in February and December 1974, respectively. Those sessions were devoted mainly to economic reconstruction policies and were keynoted by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, Hanoi's top economic planner. For a discussion of the last previous Assembly session, see the TRENDS of 24 December 1974, page 13.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 12 -

DRV FOLLOWS MODERATE LINE ON U.S. POLICIES, U.S.-DRV RELATIONS

During the past month Hanoi media have seemed to reflect a sanguine view of U.S. actions and policies in Southeast Asia, with comment on the postwar situation portraying the United States as retreating from the area. In this context there has been only low-keyed comment on U.S. actions which might be considered hostile to Vietnamese interests--the imposition of a trade embargo against South Vietnam and Cambodia, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib's Southeast Asian tour. With North Vietnam's view of the U.S. role in the region evolving, Hanoi may also be reevaluating its conditions for the establishment of relations with the United States.

Premier Pham Van Dong, in his 3 June National Assembly report, departed from the usual DRV formulations on conditions for improving relations with the United States. While repeating the standard demand that the normalization of U.S.-DRV relations be on the basis of U.S. respect for DRV sovereignty and unity, Dong introduced new language when he called upon the United States to strictly implement "the spirit" of Article 21 of the Paris agreement regarding "America's obligation to contribute to healing the wounds of the criminal war of aggression waged by America in the two parts of Vietnam." The Premier's reference to observing the "spirit" of the agreement and his failure to specify that Washington is obliged to assist North Vietnamese reconstruction may have been calculated to suggest some flexibility on the manner in which this condition could be met. Dong went on to promise that on this same basis, the DRV would also "settle with the United States other remaining problems," an offer which would presumably include Vietnamese cooperation on the problem of U.S. personnel missing in action in Vietnam.

North Vietnam's infrequent authoritative references to improving relations with the United States have not used the formula now offered by Pham Van Dong, instead generally pressing for unqualified, strict observance of the Paris accords as a condition for normalization of ties. Whenever the demand that Article 21 be implemented has been specified, previous statements have not suggested that only its "spirit" need be observed. Thus, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in a January 1975 letter to Senator Kennedy released by Hanoi media on 16 March, juxtaposed an offer of normal relations on the basis of implementation of the Paris accord with the flat demand that Washington "fulfill its obligation to contribute to the healing of the wounds of war in North Vietnam." Similarly,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 13 -

Trinh's National Assembly speech in December 1974 demanded "strict implementation" of the agreement as a condition for improved relations and, in this context, cited Article 21 and also U.S. commitments with regard to Laos and Cambodia--a stipulation not mentioned by Pham Van Dong.

HABIB TRIP, Hanoi's moderation in dealing with the Habib
TRADE EMBARGO trip to Southeast Asia can be seen both in
the paucity of DRV comment and in the tendency
to dismiss his mission as a useless venture. A brief 3 June
NHAN DAN commentary on the tour took the confident view that
events in Southeast Asia were continuing to operate against the
United States and cited as evidence the Philippine review of its
treaty obligations with the United States and the rising tide
of anti-U.S. sentiment now prevalent in Thailand. In this same
vein, a Hanoi radio commentary of the 2d derided Habib as
"merely a clumsy assistant" of the President and listed what it
characterized as other examples of the deteriorating U.S.
position in the area.

Hanoi had reacted at a similar level to the Administration's
announcement of the trade embargo against South Vietnam. Comment
was offered in commentaries by Hanoi radio on the 21st and in the
army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the following day. The paper
dismissed the U.S. move as ineffective, "out of date," and
"stupid."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 14 -

PATHET LAO DEMAND PURGE OF RIGHTISTS, HAIL U.S. AID EXPULSION

With the Pathet Lao consolidating its control over the Lao government and army, Pathet Lao media recently have adopted a more strident tone in comment calling for the purge of "ultrarightist reactionaries" and their "proteges" and welcoming the departure of the U.S. AID mission in Laos. An "editorial" broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio on 26 May set the tone for the comment in portraying the current situation as a "life-and-death class struggle" which cannot be "halted midway," adding that "we cannot coexist with the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the ultrarightist reactionary traitors." The editorial warned that "ultrarightists" continue to "hold positions of power in some places," and a commentary the following day charged that "active associates" of former rightwing leaders had hidden within the ranks of the army and were pretending to support the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU). A 28 May broadcast expanded on this theme, charging that the reactionaries were also "silently concealed within the ranks of the masses," and urging that they be "singled out and suitably and unreservedly punished."

Pathet Lao intentions were more candidly suggested by Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) General Singkaps Chounlamany, the PGNU Minister of Public Works and Transportation, in an interview in the 29 May issue of the Hungarian paper NEPSZABADSAG. He declared that the "next step" would be to insure that "medium-level leading positions will be filled by democratic-minded people" and noted that the two armies were in the process of being "united." Budapest MTI, in a 31 May report, quoted Singkaps to the effect that current Lao developments were part of a "purification process" leading to the "full liberation" of the country.

RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES Pathet Lao media have carried a wide range of comment on the question of relations with the United States. The most positive position was reflected in a 26 May French radio and television interview with PGNU Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Phoumi Vongvichit, broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio on 1 June. Responding to a question about future relations with the United States, Phoumi affirmed that the dissolution of the U.S. AID mission would not lead to the closure of the U.S. Embassy, that the PGNU still desired diplomatic ties with the United States, and that it would "always" welcome U.S. aid.

By contrast, several Pathet Lao commentaries have focused on the need for the United States to give only "direct and unconditional" assistance, and have maintained that the Lao can "do without U.S. aid"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 15 -

If Washington does not comply with this condition. The status of Americans remaining in Laos was only indirectly addressed in a 31 May KPL commentary entitled "All Americans Must Leave Laos." The commentary noted that 350 Americans still remained in Laos and it cited Western press reports on hostility toward Americans and U.S. Embassy advice that U.S. correspondents leave the country, but it did not explicitly demand the departure of all Americans despite the KPL title. Subsequent comment on this issue has been contradictory, with different views expressed in two commentaries on 4 June. A Pathet Lao news agency (KPL) commentary suggested that no further U.S. withdrawals were necessary when it stated that with the departure of the U.S. AID mission "the contingent of U.S. aggressors has been definitely driven out of Laos." Another commentary on the 4th, broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio, maintained that the "U.S. imperialists have not left Laos completely" and urged the armed forces to unite to win new victories and "completely eliminate the American enemy."

PEKING Peking media promptly replayed Pathet Lao radio commentaries and news reports on the situation in Laos. For example, NCNA reported within hours a summary of the 26 May Radio Pathet Lao editorial which called for "complete victory." Reports by the NCNA correspondent in Vientiane reflect the changing situation with the recent gains by the LPF. A 30 May NCNA correspondent's report hailed the struggle of the Lao people "under the leadership of the Lao Patriotic Front" whose goal was described as the "independence of the country and the liberation of the nation." By contrast, the previous NCNA correspondent's report, dated 15 May, addressed itself to the less ambitious struggle of the "Lao people" to uphold the Vientiane agreement. The correspondent's report on the 30th also included the assessment that recent events had dealt a "powerful blow at the U.S. neocolonialist policy in Laos," a departure from recent correspondent's reports which had not commented on American policy or on the U.S. presence in Laos.

MOSCOW Soviet coverage of Laotian developments remains fairly low-keyed, with short TASS news reports and occasional press and radio commentaries emphasizing that the atmosphere is calm and the "political situation is normal." Reportage on anti-American demonstrations in Vientiane and the removal of U.S. AID personnel has been brief, fairly factual, and expectedly focused on student allegations of CIA "interference" in the internal affairs of Laos through the AID organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 16 -

HA NOI North Vietnamese media have publicized KPL reports on developments in Laos and there has been scattered comment in the Hanoi press. A commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, carried by VNA on the 30th, was predictably more militant than the other DRV reporting and highlighted the anti-American aspect of the recent "struggle" in Laos. The commentary cited the "successful attacks on the instruments of the U.S. neocolonialist war of aggression in Laos" and praised the purging of rightists "from the center down to the grassroots level" of the administrative apparatus and the movement of Pathet Lao forces into "all" cities and district towns. It concluded that the United States had suffered "new and heavy defeats" in the wake of its "complete failure" in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 JUNE 1975

- 17 -

K O R E A

KIM STRESSES PEACE, THIRD WORLD UNITY IN NORTH AFRICA

DPRK President Kim Il-song used the Algerian and Mauritanian portions of his current foreign tour to identify the DPRK with the nonaligned nations, to reiterate North Korea's solidarity with the Third World, and to stress that Pyongyang will not initiate armed aggression in Korea. While recently Kim had promised to "strongly support" the South Korean people should they revolt--in his 18 April speech while visiting Peking--during his current African tour he has not offered Northern support for the "struggle" of the South Korean people either in his speeches or in interviews. In a 31 May AFP interview, carried by KCNA on 3 June, Kim repeated a point he had made in a September 1974 speech to a group of Korean students from Japan, that "revolution is not exported." "The revolution is to be launched by the South Korean people themselves," Kim told AFP, "we cannot launch it in their stead."

Kim was in Algeria from 26-30 May and again on 1-2 June, and in Mauritania briefly on 31 May and 1 June. The DPRK-Algerian communique said that talks proceeded in an atmosphere of "militant friendship and mutual understanding," and led to "unity of views" on the problems discussed. No communique has yet emerged from the Mauritanian visit, but in the 31 May AFP interview Kim promised one would be forthcoming, and said "there is no difference of views" between the two countries.

KOREAN SITUATION In a 29 May interview with the official Algerian newspaper EL MOUDJAHID, carried by KCNA on the 31st, Kim underscored the North's peaceful intentions in Korea, reviewing Northern reunification proposals and offers to both the United States and South Korea for peace agreements. In the interview Kim observed that three years after the July 1972 DPRK-ROK joint statement, relations are returning to the condition they were in prior to the statement and blamed the South for the worsening of relations. In none of his speeches and interviews in Africa did Kim specifically refer to the North-South dialog, but in the 2 June joint communique the Algerians condemned Seoul for "breaking up the dialog."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

As in Romania, where he visited from 22-26 May, Kim paid scant attention in his African speeches to the possibility of renewed conflict in Korea, though in a banquet speech on the 29th in Algeria he did accuse the "imperialists" of "war threats" and "nuclear blackmail." In EL MOUDJAHID, however, Kim painted a grimmer picture more in line with the current DPRK media portrayal of the situation. Repeating a theme Pyongyang had introduced in February and incorporated in a 10 March Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, Kim accused the U.S. of reinforcing its troops in South Korea, reorganizing its operational command, and placing "large quantities" of nuclear weapons along the DMZ. Calling such action an "unpardonable, malevolent challenge" to the Korean people, Kim claimed it had "created the danger of another war breaking out in Korea at any moment." He promised to meet "aggression" with "revolutionary war" and to "counter the enemy's deceptive 'peace' scheme with revolutionary principle." Repeating a theme he used in Peking in April, Kim said that in any future war the North would lose only the military demarcation line, but would gain the country's reunification.

By contrast, in the 31 May AFP interview Kim minimized the dangers of renewed conflict in Korea. He noted that "now the United States is not in a position to fight either on a military front or an economic one," and professed to be "optimistic the enemy will not be able to unleash a war." He did not, however, question directly the U.S. military commitment to South Korea. Kim stated that "we may not dare say" that the U.S. has gone "totally bankrupt militarily," despite any problems it may currently have. Kim emphasized that the North had repeatedly pledged not to invade the South, and pointed out that an invasion "right now" was out of the question, since he was on a foreign tour and "our soldiers are helping the peasants in farming."

In the same interview Kim suggested that a North-South confederation could be formed "if the movement for democracy triumphs and a democratic figure comes to power in South Korea." Though Kim indicated this was part of his June 1973 five-point proposal, it has never been explicitly stated that a "democratic figure" must come to power in the South before a confederation could be formed. Kim's formulation seems an attempt to wed a theme that has again become standard in DPRK media after a two-year hiatus following the July 1972 joint statement--the suggestion that a "democratic figure" take power in Seoul--with an older proposal advocating formation of a North-South confederation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 19 -

During his visit to Algeria Kim paid special attention to the possibility of UN action forcing withdrawal from South Korea of U.S. troops "disguised as UN forces," much more so than he had during the visit of Algerian President Boumedienne to Pyongyang in March 1974. In his 28 May rally speech Kim noted that the UN debate on the Korean question "has been progressing favorably for our people's cause," and he expressed confidence that "in the future" forces supporting the North's position would "overwhelm" the "imperialists" and would take "decisive action for the withdrawal of UN forces." The joint communique with Algeria included a call by both sides for the next UN General Assembly to take steps "to withdraw the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under its flag," a call not included in the 1974 joint communique.

DPRK-THIRD WORLD
RELATIONS

Reflecting North Korea's interest in joining the nonaligned group, Kim observed in his speech on the 28th that the policy of non-alignment was uniting countries "with differing social systems," and that the principles of nonalignment are in accord with the principles of "independent home and foreign policies" pursued by the North. In the joint communique the DPRK side went even further, and it "eagerly welcomed" a recommendation by the coordination bureau of the nonaligned states that met in Havana in March 1975--that the DPRK be admitted as a member of the nonaligned group of nations.

Kim said nothing new regarding North Korean unity with the Third World, sticking to themes he has repeated regularly since Pyongyang began identifying itself more closely with the Third World late in 1973, following the October Arab-Israeli War and the Arab oil embargo. However, in a 31 May speech at a mass meeting in Nouakchott, Mauritania, Kim went beyond the North's normal position and totally identified North Korea with the Third World, referring to "we Third World peoples." Apparently the only previous time Kim has gone this far publicly was in June 1974, when in receiving the credentials of the Malagasy ambassador he noted the two countries belonged to the Third World. In his rally speech on the 28th in Algeria Kim noted the Third World struggle to "destroy the old international economic order" and establish a new one, as well as efforts to "convert the United Nations into a truly peace-loving, progressive organization."

CONFIDENTIAL

4 JUNE 1975

- 20 -

INDONESIAN CP

PARTY'S 55TH ANNIVERSARY OBSERVED BY PKI, PRC, USSR

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) "delegation" in Peking, the only active PKI delegation abroad, has greeted the party's 55th anniversary with a lengthy statement underscoring the PKI's determination to pursue armed struggle and warning against Soviet attempts to sabotage the party's course. Peking and Moscow coverage of the anniversary demonstrated their competing interests in the Indonesian party and also reflected both nations' recent efforts to improve state relations with Indonesia.

PKI STATEMENT A 23 May statement issued by the PKI delegation in Peking and signed by delegation chairman Junuf Adjitorop was broadcast in two parts on 24 and 25 May by the PRC-based clandestine radio station Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR).^{*} It predicted that the communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam would provide "encouragement" to the Indonesian revolution, but estimated that the struggle would be long, difficult, and "full of twists and turns" in the face of a balance of forces vastly unfavorable to the revolution.

The statement forcefully reaffirmed the principles of the party's 1966 "self-criticism" and 1967 "new program" which had repudiated the PKI's former "peaceful road" culminating in the purges of 1965 and had committed it to a Maoist strategy of agrarian armed struggle. The statement expressed confidence that in the long run the inevitably sharpening contradictions in semicolonial, semifeudal Indonesian society, exacerbated by "self-defeating, repressive policies" of the "Suharto fascist military clique," favored the growth of revolutionary forces led by the PKI. The statement affirmed the primacy of rural armed struggle and the necessity of uniting workers and peasants as the main force and national bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and students as auxiliary forces in a front of progressive classes. It urged priority attention to ideological work, a "weakness" of the PKI which the statement said led to "opportunism" and the disaster of 1965. In particular, the statement warned against "poisons" spread by

^{*} There is no China-based clandestine station beaming specifically to Indonesia, but the VOMR in the past has occasionally carried propaganda intended for Indonesian audiences.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 JUNE 1975

- 21 -

Soviet-sponsored "revisionist renegades" who allegedly sabotage the PKI with "splittist activities." A shorter PKI message of 23 May 1974, marking the party's 54th anniversary, had similarly reaffirmed the essentials of the 1966 "self-criticism" and 1967 "new program."

PEKING, MOSCOW Consistent with its usual practice on such quinquennials, Peking marked the PKI anniversary with a 22 May CCP Central Committee message addressed to the PKI delegation in Peking. The statement affirmed the "profound friendship and militant unity on the basis of proletarian internationalism" between the "two parties and two peoples," a relationship which the CCP hoped would be "further consolidated and developed," and it expressed satisfaction that the PKI had persevered in armed struggle "under the most difficult and complicated conditions." At the same time, the message reflected Peking's concurrent intention to improve relations with Jakarta by making no mention of the Indonesian government or of the 1965 anticommunist massacres. The Chinese message on the party's 50th anniversary in 1970 had attacked the "Suharto fascist military clique" for its "most barbarous and brutal sanguinary massacre" in 1965.

PRAVDA marked the 55th anniversary by reporting on 23 May the "program document" of Soviet-aligned Indonesian communists attacking the "Maoist concept of the countryside as the leading center of mass movements," and advocating the creation of a "national unity front" centered in the urban areas to work for gradual reform. The report avoided any reference to opposition to the Suharto government's present policies, reflecting the Soviet desire to normalize state relations. A 30 May TASS report tried to demonstrate Peking's equivocal position over Indonesia by playing up Indonesian press reports concerning the discovery of recent "smuggling of Maoist agents from China into Indonesia with the aim of organizing political and economic sabotage."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ENDS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 22 -

U S S R

SHCHERBITSKIY ASSUMES CONTROL OVER KIEV CITY PARTY ORGANIZATION

In a move clearly aimed at strengthening his local authority, Ukrainian First Secretary V.V. Shcherbitskiy has split the Kiev city party organization from the Kiev oblast organization and taken it under his own direct supervision. The move drastically weakens Kiev Obkom First Secretary and Ukrainian Politburo candidate member V.M. Tsybulko, a close protege of Shcherbitskiy's chief rival, Ukrainian Premier A.P. Lyashko. As such, the move appears to open the maneuvering preparatory to the coming Ukrainian party congress and the election of a new Ukrainian leadership.

At a 12 May Kiev gorkom plenum Shcherbitskiy announced a campaign to make Kiev a model city and, declaring that this would require "constant, direct attention to its work on the part of the Ukrainian Central Committee and Government," revealed that the capital city's organization was being separated from the oblast organization and placed directly under the Ukrainian Central Committee. Shcherbitskiy thereby takes direct control over what he termed the Ukraine's biggest party organization (177,000 party members), which has been run by city First Secretary A.P. Botvin, an associate of ousted republic First Secretary Shelest, and controlled by oblast First Secretary Tsybulko, former assistant to Lyashko. Although Shcherbitskiy sought to reassure the Kiev oblast organization that it would remain "one of the great party organizations of the republic," with its 77,000 party members, it clearly will no longer rank with Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk and Donetsk. Previously the oblast first secretary has always been a major figure and the city first secretary a minor figure. Now Tsybulko may not even rate reelection as republic Politburo candidate member at the coming Ukrainian party congress.

Shcherbitskiy also indicated that the functions of the city party organization would be expanded, presumably with a corresponding diminution of oblast power. This would make the status of Kiev city similar to that of Moscow city, which under Khrushchev became predominant over Moscow oblast. Until the mid-1940's, the Ukrainian first secretary simultaneously held the posts of first secretary of Kiev city and oblast.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TBLIS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 23 -

City First Secretary Botvin praised the reorganization in his speech at the 20 May Ukrainian Central Committee plenum; oblast First Secretary Tsybulko did not speak. However, Botvin's personal position is none too secure, either. Shcherbitskiy has been highly critical of both Kiev oblast and city since he became republic first secretary in 1972, and during 1973 or early 1974 the Kiev city committee's cadre work was brought up for critical examination in the Ukrainian Politburo, according to a 30 July 1974 PRAVDA article by republic Second Secretary I.K. Lutak.

Shcherbitskiy has made extensive personnel shifts in the Kiev city committee, and by early 1975 all the city committee's secretaries except First Secretary Botvin had been replaced. At the recent May 1975 city committee plenum Shcherbitskiy was critical of Botvin and other city leaders for not doing a good enough job, and Second Secretary O.P. Naumenko was replaced and transferred to work in the Ukrainian Central Committee apparatus. Further, in his speech at the 20 May Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, Shcherbitskiy was highly critical of the conduct of the 12 May city committee plenum and revealed that he had interrupted the proceedings to force city officials to be more self-critical. He criticized Botvin for not critically analyzing the work of the city bureau and various local officials and complained that the first speakers, instead of criticizing the "many" shortcomings in the city, had made "laudatory, self-satisfied speeches." "Some comrades had to be corrected," he declared, and then "the character of the speeches substantially changed."

Botvin rose through the Kharkov party organization, as had former republic First Secretary Shelest, and in 1961 Botvin became Kiev oblast second secretary, deputy to then oblast committee First Secretary Shelest. He served as first secretary of the Ukrainian capital during almost all of Shelest's tenure as republic first secretary.

Another hint that Premier Lyashko's position may have weakened appeared when he was scheduled first among the republic Politburo members to speak in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet election campaign. Normally, the most junior Politburo members are scheduled first, then the senior members, and finally the republic first secretary, whose speech represents the climax of the campaign. That Lyashko's early scheduling was not due to some conflict of timing or other accidental factor was suggested by the fact that he was similarly scheduled first in the 1974 election campaign. By contrast, in 1971, the last previous election campaign, he had spoken third from last, as befitted his position.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 24 -

GOSPLAN CHAIRMAN BAYBAKOV WARNS OF GROWING FOREIGN THREAT

Gosplan Chairman N.K. Baybakov, in a May KOMMUNIST article about the Soviet economy during World War II, lays unusual stress upon the current importance of meeting defense needs and portrays a growing, rather than diminishing, threat from abroad, stoked by the economic crises in the West. While such statements might be expected from a military leader, they are quite uncharacteristic of Baybakov, who has tended to stress welfare and consumer goals in his previous public statements. Baybakov does not actually advocate increased defense spending, but his warnings of international danger--among the sharpest in recent months--appear to carry this implication.

Although stating that the "defense industry is at the proper level" now, he stressed that defense would continue to be maintained at the proper level and that the armed forces would be "further developed" and provided with modern arms. To justify high defense spending, he referred both to the lessons of World War II and to the present "unceasing intrigues of the enemies of peace." He painted a bleak picture of the international situation, pointing to the existence of "hotbeds of international tension," declaring that "the aggressive essence and class nature of imperialism remain unchanged," and deploring the arms policies of Western states as constituting "the material preparation for a new war."

He linked the present tension to the "unprecedented" crises in the West--recession, unemployment, inflation, energy crisis, and currency crises--which he said have given new impetus to "opponents of detente, advocates of an arms race, and lovers of adventure and provocations." He also cited Brezhnev's words that "we must never forget the danger posed by the adventuresome policy of foes of peace" and that the armed forces must have "everything necessary" for defending the country.

Baybakov's unusual venture into a polemical style of writing on behalf of defense comes against the background of ambivalent indications regarding Soviet attitudes toward defense and detente. The December 1974 CPSU plenum had approved a reduction in the symbolic public defense budget from 17.6 billion rubles for 1974 to 17.4 billion for 1975, as if signaling the lessening of the threat of war. The same implication seemed to be conveyed by the 18 December PRAVDA editorial on the plenum, which ignored defense and presented an optimistic picture of the international situation. It declared that detente was becoming firmer and the danger of war receding and it did not include any caveat about continuing imperialist intrigues or about the arms race.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOIA b7E
4 JUNE 1975

- 25 -

On the other hand, an equivocal note began to creep into Soviet statements on the international situation in recent months. While the commitment to detente has remained the predominant theme of Soviet public comment, a sharper accent has been placed on the standard caveats about the negative influence of the opponents of detente in the West. This note of equivocation was clearly expressed in the resolution of the April CPSU plenum, which combined an endorsement of Brezhnev's efforts on behalf of the "peace program" set forth by the 24th CPSU Congress with a warning that the "forces of war, reaction and aggression" were making unceasing efforts to undermine peace.

While it is too soon to say whether Baybakov's article signals a renewed stress on defense in Soviet policy, it is probably a safe bet that many officials within the regime will read it as such.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

4 JUNE 1975

- 26 -

NOTES

MOSCOW ON PEKING BORDER TALKS: An unusually blunt assessment that the Sino-Soviet border talks have reached a complete impasse was offered on 30 May by IZVESTIYA's prominent political observer A. Bovin in remarks on Moscow radio's "International Situation--Questions and Answers" program. Bovin responded to a listener's query about the state of the talks by saying they "reached a deadlock long ago" and presently "there is no way out in sight." He showed no Soviet flexibility over the border issue, blaming the Chinese for not accepting Moscow's "businesslike" proposal, which calls for a joint declaration specifying areas of the frontier where the two sides' boundaries are the same and for talks aimed at reaching "an understanding" on "individual segments where there is dispute." Bovin's position is virtually identical to that voiced in an official Soviet Government statement at the height of the border conflict in June 1969. Bovin underlined the Soviet view that the main obstacle in the talks was Peking's persistent demand for Soviet troops to withdraw from allegedly disputed border regions as a prerequisite for meaningful discussions, asserting flatly that "it is clear that the Soviet Government cannot and will never agree to this." Bovin's assessment is consonant with negative media indications from both sides when chief Soviet negotiator Illichev departed from Peking on 5 May.

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS: While Chinese media have continued to treat favorably high-level U.S. official pronouncements on U.S. strategic resolve as a world power, particularly in regard to the Soviet Union, Peking has reacted negatively to U.S. statements on other issues which Peking views as antagonistic to the Third World. Most recently, a 30 May NCNA report rebuked Secretary Kissinger for certain remarks at the 28-29 May Paris meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). NCNA reported that the Secretary merely paid "lip service" to improving Western economic relations with the Third World countries, was opposed to Third World economic unity, and even "threatened" the Third World in warning against economic tests of strength with the developed OECD countries. Such critical reportage was similar to NCNA's 15 April 1974 report on Secretary Kissinger's address that day to the UN General Assembly special session on raw materials, which had accused Kissinger of having "threatened" Third World nations in order to sap their economic unity.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170026-

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

JUNE 1975

- 27 -

PRC EDUCATIONAL POLICY: Liaoning province, perhaps responding to strong central injunctions calling for "stability and unity," apparently has decided on a low-key approach to resolve a recent local dispute over educational policy. On 23 April a LIAONING DAILY editor's note broadcast on the provincial radio had called for public discussion of two opposing posters aired at the same time. The posters, signed by students at a local technical college, had disagreed over whether graduates should become "ordinary workers." One poster declared that the technical contributions made by college graduates were greater and should be recognized; the second poster asserted that graduates "should be nothing else but ordinary workers, the more ordinary the better." The editor's note calling for discussion seemed to signal a major provincial campaign on the issue, but instead the issue disappeared from the media until 27 May, when another Liaoning broadcast stated that discussions on the problem had been organized by the college and that peasants and workers had assisted in quickly solving "some questions which had remained after heated debate in the college." The broadcast carefully avoided aiming vituperative remarks at any students who had opposed graduates becoming ordinary workers, but quoted one of the students as saying that after reeducation by the peasants, she realized the need to place herself "on an equal footing with the workers." Liaoning has been a pacesetter in establishing national educational policies in the past, and currently Liaoning's Chaoyang agricultural college is a national model for training socially conscious students. An article by the Chaoyang party committee in the May RED FLAG again stressed that graduates must return to the countryside to become "new-type peasants."

CONFIDENTIAL

EBIS TRENDS
4 JUNE 1975

- 1 -

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 26 MAY - 1 JUNE 1975

<u>Moscow (2686 items)</u>			<u>Peking (985 items)</u>		
Upcoming Union Republic Supreme Soviet Elections	(5Z)	10Z	DPRK's Kim Il-sung in Romania	(--)	7Z
Danish Queen Margrethe in USSR	(--)	7Z	Indochina	(20Z)	6Z
China	(8Z)	6Z	Africa	(1Z)	5Z
Salyut 4/Soyuz 18 Link-up	(1Z)	4Z	[African Libera- tion Day	(--)	3Z]
Soviet Leaders' Greetings to Czech President Husak on Election	(--)	3Z	Romanian Government Delegation in PRC	(--)	4Z
NATO Defense Council Meeting, Brussels	(--)	2Z	USSR-Egyptian Differences	(1Z)	3Z
			International Children's Day	(--)	3Z

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues. In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.